Leeds University Library

Realism and Anti-Realism Reading List

Realism and Antirealism, 2016/17, Semester 1
Dr. Robert Knowles
Tutor information is taken from the Module Catalogue

For this module, your focus should be on attending lectures and seminars and on making sure that you understand the reading from the set text. You are not required to do any reading other than the set seminar reading. This list is provided so that you can follow up anything you are particularly interested in, and to aid you in writing your essay and preparing for your exam.

General Works

Set Text: Brock and Mares Realism and Anti-Realism (Acumen)

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has entries on each of the topics we will cover, and is an excellent resource both forgiving you a detailed overview of each topic, and for directing you towards further reading material.
A second excellent online resource is the Realism and Anti-realism entry in Oxford Bibliographies Online, which provides links to a wealth of other resources and brief descriptions of their content.

Miller, A. Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [electronic resource]. (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/realism/

Blackburn, S. 2001. Think : a Compelling Introduction to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Devitt, M. 1983. Dummett's Anti-Realism. Journal of Philosophy  80: 73–99.

Devitt, M. 1991. Aberrations of the Realism Debate. Philosophical Studies  61: 43–63.

Hale. B. 1997. Realism and its Oppositions. In B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 271–308. Available as an Online Course Reading in the VLE

McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and world Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nagel, T. 1989. The View from Nowhere Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivit y. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wright, C. 1993. Realism, Meaning, and Truth Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd Edition.

Week 1: Existence and Ontological Commitment

Quine, W. V. 1948. On What There Is. Review of metaphysics. 2: 21-38.

Alston, W. P. 1958. Ontological Commitments. Philosophical Studies 9: 8-7.

Lewis, D. and Lewis, S. 1970. Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48: 206-212.

Jackson, F. 1980. Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase. Philosophy 55: 303-315.

Melia, J. 1995. On What There's Not. Analysis 55: 223-229.

van Inwagen, P. 1998. Meta-Ontology. Erkenntnis: 233-250.

Yablo, S. 1998. Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? Aristotelian Society. Supplementary volume  72: 229-262.

Thomasson, A. L. 2007. Parsimony and Ontological Commitment. In her 2007. Ordinary Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Manley, D. 2009. When Best Theories Go Bad. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78: 392-405. 

von Solodkoff, T. 2014. Paraphrase Strategies in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass. 9: 570- 582.

Week 2: Mind-Dependence (i) Idealism 

Bubner, R. 2003. The Innovations of Idealism . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dicker, G. 2011. Berkeley's Idealism : a Critical Examination . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foster, J. 1982. The Case for IdealismLondon: Routledge.

Guyer, P. and Horstmann, R. 2005. Idealism. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [electronic resource]

Hylton, P. 1990. Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moore, A. W. 1997. Points of View . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 

Crispin Wright. Saving the differences : essays on themes from Truth and objectivity  . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Week 3: Mind-Dependence (ii): Verificationism 

Ayer, A. J. 1936. Language Truth and Logic Dover, Chapter 1.

Lewis, D. 1988. Statements Partly About Observation. Philosophical Papers and Reviews  17: 1-31.

Miller, A. 2006. Realism and Antirealism. In E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of language  , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 983–1005.

Stern, R. 2015. Transcendental Arguments. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [electronic resource]

Uebel, T. 2012. Vienna Circle. In Zalta, E. N. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [electronic resource].

Wright, C. 1989. The Verification Principle: Another Puncture – Another Patch. Mind 98: 611-622. 

Week 4: Colour

Maund, B. 2012. Color. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [electronic resource]. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/color/

Campbell, J. 1993. A Simple View of Colour. In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection  Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257-268.  http://istsocrates.berkeley.edu/~jcampbel/documents/Colour.pdf 

McGinn, C. 1996. Another Look at Color. Journal of Philosophy  93: 537-553.

Cohen, J. 2012. Précis of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Analytic philosophy.  53: 288-296.

Laura, G. Colour. Philosophy Compass 9: 803-813.

Wedgwood, R. 1997. The Essence of Response-Dependence. European Review of Philosophy 3: 31-54. http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~wedgwood/respodep.html

Week 5: Morality 

Brink, D. O. 1984. Moral  Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 112–225.

Dreier, J. (ed.) 2006. Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory  . Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Eklund, M. 2007. Fictionalism. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy [electronic resource].

Garner, R. T. 1990. On the Genuine Queerness of Moral  Properties and Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68: 137–146.

Kalderon, M. E. 2005. Moral Fictionalism . Oxford: Clarendon.

Joyce, R. 2001. The Myth of Morality . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.  London: Penguin Books, Chapter 1.

Miller, A. 2013. Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction . Cambridge: Polity.

Railton, P. 1986. Moral Realism. Philosophical Review  95: 163–207.

Railton, P. 1998. Red, Bitter, Good. European Review of Philosophy 3: 67–84.

Week 6: Scientific Realism

Ladyman, J. 2002.  Understanding philosophy of science  . London: Routledge, part II.

Smart, J. J. 1993. C. Our Place in the Universe. Oxford: Blackwell, Ch. 3.

Lipton, P. 1994. Truth, Existence, and Best Explanation. In Derksen, A. A. (ed.) The Scientific Realism of Rom Harré. Tillburg University Press.

Devitt, M. 2008. Realism  /Anti- realism.  In Psillos, S. and Curd, M. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science . London: Routledge, 224–235.

Week 7: Scientific Antirealism

van Fraassen, B. 1980.  The Scientific Image . Oxford: Clarendon.

Ladyman, J. 2002. Understanding Philosophy of Science  . London: Routledge, part II.

Papineau, D. (ed.) 1996. The philosophy of science  . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kuhn, T. 1970.  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions University of Chicago Press.

Week 8: Mathematical Realism

Colyvan, M. 2001. The indispensability of mathematics  . New York: Oxford University Press.

Friend, M. 2007. Introducing philosophy of mathematics  . Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 

Kitcher, P. 1983. The nature of mathematical knowledge  . New York: Oxford University Press.

Linnebo, Ø. 2009. Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics  . In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [electronic resource].

Maddy, P. 1992. Realism in mathematics  . Oxford: Clarendon.

Shapiro, S. (ed.) 2005. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic  . New York: Oxford University Press.

Week 9: Mathematical Antirealism

Benacerraf, P. 1965. What Numbers Could Not Be. Philosophical Review 74.1: 47-73.

Benacerraf, P. 1973. Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70: 661-679.

Field, H. 1980.  Science Without Numbers : a Defence of Nominalism.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yablo, S. 2001. Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy  25.1: 72-102. http://web.mit.edu/~yablo/www/gf.pdf 

Melia, Joseph. 1995. On What There's Not. Analysis 55.4: 223-229. 

Melia, Joseph. 2000. Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument. Mind  109.435: 455-480. 

Week 10: Fiction

Braun, D. 2005. Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs. 39 (2005): 596–631.

Brock, S. 2002. Fictionalism about Fictional Characters. Noûs. 36: 1–21.

Everett, A. 2005. Against Fictional Realism. Journal of Philosophy 102: 624–649.

Friend, S. 2007. Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass. 2: 141-156.

van Inwagen, P. 2003. Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities. In Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 131–157. Available as an Online Course Reading in the VLE

Salmon, N. 1998. Nonexistence. Noûs  32: 277–319.

Thomasson, A. L. 1999. Fiction and Metaphysics . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Thomasson, A. L. 2003. Fictional Characters and Literary Practices. British Journal of Aesthetics  43: 138–157.

Walton, K. L. 1990. Doing Without Fictitious Entities. In his 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 385–419.

This list was last updated on 21/09/2016