PHIL3421
Module Reading List

Lecture 1: Mind and Brain

Robert Kirk, Mind & Body, Chapter 1: ‘Introduction: are we just machines?’, pp. 1-28.  

E.J. Lowe, An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 2: ‘Minds, bodies and people’, pp. 8-38.

Lecture 2: Dualism

Rene Descartes, Meditations (especially Meditation VI); available here

W. Robinson, 'Epiphenomenalism', in SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/

H. Robinson, 'Dualism', in SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/

Kathleen Wilkes, Real People: personal identity without thought experiments, Chapter 5: ‘Being in two minds’, pp. 132-67. 

Lecture 3: Epiphenomanlism & Physicalism

J.J.C. Smart, ‘Sensations and brain processes’, reprinted in Timothy O’Connor and David Robb, eds., Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings, Essay 6, pp. 121-37.  

T. Crane and D.H. Mellor, ‘There is no question of physicalism’, Mind (1990), pp. 185-206. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254959

Janet Levin, ‘Could love be like a heatwave? Physicalism and the subjective character of experience’, Philosophical Studies 49 (1986), pp. 245-61. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4319824

Philip Petit, ‘A definition of physicalism’, Analysis 53 (1993), pp. 212-223. Available here: https://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/DefinitionofPhysicalism_Analysis_1993.pdf

Lecture 4: Functionalism

P. Smith and O.R. Jones, Philosophy of Mind: an introduction, Chapter X: ‘Two theories of belief’, pp. 135-51. OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019)   

Hilary Putnam, ‘Brains and behaviour’, reprinted in Mind, Language and Reality, Essay 16, pp. 325-41 OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019) .  

Lecture 5: Challenges to Functionalism

D. Braddon-Mitchell and F. Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Chapter 7: ‘Four challenges to functionalism’, pp. 107-128. OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019)      

J. Kim, Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 6: ‘Mind as a causal system’, pp. 151-71 OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019) .  

Lecture 6: The Representational Theory of Mind

Matthew Katz (2013). ‘Jerry Fodor and the Representational Theory of Mind’, in A. Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Key Thinkers, pp. 169-87.  

D. Pitt (2012). ‘Mental Representation’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/>.

Michael Rescorla (2015). ‘The Computational Theory of Mind’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2015/entries/computational-mind>.

Lecture 7: The Language of Thought

Jerry Fodor (1987). ‘Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought’ (Appendix to his Psychosemantics), pp. 135-71. OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019)   

Elizabeth Camp (2007). ‘Thinking with Maps’. Philosophical Perspectives 21: 145-182.

Lecture 8: Naturalistic Theories of Content

Karen Neander (2008). ‘Teleological Theories of Mental Content: Can Darwin Solve the Problem of Intentionality?’, in M. Ruse (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, pp. 381-409. OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019)   

Ruth Garrett Millikan (1989). ‘Biosemantics’. The Journal of Philosophy 86: 281-297.

Ruth Garrett Millikan (1990). ‘Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox’. The Philosophical Review 99: 323-353.

Fred Dretske (1994). ‘A Recipe for Thought’, in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019)   

Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). ‘On a Causal Theory of Content’, Philosophical Perspectives 3: 165-186.

Lecture 9: Internalism and Externalism

Frances Egan (2009). ‘Wide Content’, in A. Beckerman, B. McLauglin & S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019)   

Katalin Farkas (2003). ‘What Is Externalism?’. Philosophical Studies 112 (3): 187-208.

Asa Wikforss (2007). ‘Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism’. Philosophy Compass 3: 158-181.

Lecture 10: Eliminativism and Instrumentalism

Daniel Dennett (1981). ‘True Believers’, in J. Haugeland, Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence: 57-79; available here: https://www.cs.tufts.edu/comp/150AAA/DennettTrueBelievers.pdf

Kirstin Andrews (2000). ‘Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7): 12-24.

Kathrin Gluer (2006). ‘The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or A Priori Necessity?’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3): 337-359.

David Lewis (1974). ‘Radical Interpretation’. Synthese 23: 331-344.

P. Churchland, ‘Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), pp. 67-90; reprinted in William Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition, pp. 206-23.

John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: a contemporary introduction, Chapter 12: ‘Eliminativism’, pp. 170-6.    

Lecture 11: Does Consciousness Depend on Content?

David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2013). ‘Tracking Representationalism: Lycan, Dretske, and Tye’, in A. Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Key Thinkers.    

Amy Kind (2010). ‘Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness’. Philosophy Compass 5 (10): 902-913.

David Chalmers (2004). ‘The Representational Character of Experience’, in B. Leiter The Future for Philosophy. OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019)   

Lecture 12: Does Content Depend on Consciousness?

Brie Gertler (2001). ‘The Relationship Between Phenomenality and Intentionality’. Psyche 7 (17).

Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2002). ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality’, in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (CHG 24/09/2019) .  

Michelle Montague (2010). ‘Recent Work on Intentionality’. Analysis Reviews 70 (4): 765-782.

This list was last updated on 09/10/2019