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Module Reading List

Moral Philosophy, 2021/22, Semester 1
Dr Gerald Lang
Tutor information is taken from the Module Catalogue


Required Reading

Heathwood, Chris., 2005. The problem of defective desires. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(4), pp.487-504.  

Fletcher, Guy., 2013. A fresh start for the objective-list theory of well-being. Utilitas, 25(2), pp.206-220.  

Recommended Reading

Feinberg, Joel., 1984. Chapter 2: Puzzling Cases. In his Harm to Others. Oxford: Oxford University Press.    

Nozick, Robert., 1989. Chapter 10: Happiness. In his The Examined LifeNew York: Simon & Shuster OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (afp 30/09/2019) .  

Fletcher, Guy., 2016. Objective List Theories. In Fletcher, G. (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-being (pp.148-160). Routledge Available as an Online Course Reading in Minerva .   


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Required Reading

Nagel, Thomas., 1970. Death. Noûs, 4(1), pp.73-80.  

Fischer, John Martin 2009. 'Chapter 6: Why Immortality is Not So Bad' in his Our stories: Essays on life, death, and free will.

Recommended Reading

Nussbaum, Martha. 1994.Chapter 6: Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on death and the Voice of Nature. In her The Therapy of DesirePrinceton: Princeton University Press.


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Required Reading

Keller, Simon. 2013. Partiality. Princeton University Press. Chapter 2

Crisp, Roger. 2018. Against Partiality. The Lindley Lecture.

Recommended Reading

Keller, Simon. 2013. Partiality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 4.   

Williams, Bernard. 1981. Persons, character and morality. In his Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.    

Wolf, Susan. 1992. Morality and Partiality. Philosophical Perspectives 6: pp. 243-259.

Scheffler, Samuel. 2010. Morality and Reasonable Partiality. In Brian Feltham and John Cottingham (eds), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oxford: Oxford Unversity Press.    

De Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna, and Peter Singer. 2012. The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason. Ethics 123, 2: 9-31.


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The Trolley Problem

 Required Readings

Otsuka, M. 2008. Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases. Utilitas 20: pp. 92-110

Thomson, J, J. 2008. Turning the Trolley. Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, 4: pp. 359- 374.

Further Readings

Foot, P. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Oxford Review, 5, pp.5-15.

Thomson, J.J. 1985. The trolley problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), pp.1395-1415

 Kamm, F. 1996. Morality, Mortality, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 6.

Kamm, Frances. 2015. The Trolley Problem Mysteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kamm, Frances. The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not Intend the Means to His End, Aristotelian Society. Supplementary volume. 74: 21-39.

Liao, Matthew. The Loop Case and Kamm’s Doctrine of Triple Effect, Philosophical studies. 146. 223-231

Kamm, Frances. 2006. Intricate Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Edmonds, D. 2015. Would you Kill the Fat Man? The Trolley Problem and What Your Answer Tells us about Right and Wrong

Bennett, Jonathan. Whatever the consequences. Analysis. 26. 83-102   

Quinn, Warren. Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, Philosophy & public affairs. 18. 334-35.

Parfit, D. 2011. On What Matters, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Parts 1-2

Greene, J. Moral Tribes. 2015. London: Atlantic 

Kumar, V, and R Campbell. 2012. On the normative significance of experimental moral psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25, 3: 311-330

 Berker, S. 2009. The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37, 4: 239-329.

Kahane, G. 2012. On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language 27, 5: 519-545.

Fried, B. 2012. What Does Matter? The Case for Killing the Trolley Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 62, 248: 505-529

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Required Reading

Benn, Claire, 2017. Supererogatory Spandrels. Etica & Politica, 19(1), pp.269-290.


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Ethical Theories

Required Reading

Hooker, Brad, 1996. ‘Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule-consequentialism’. Mind 105, 420: 531–552.

Scanlon, T.M., 1998.What We Owe To Each Other (Harvard University Press), chapter 5.

You may want to read some of the following SEP entries for some further context:

Ashford, Elizabeth and Tim Mulgan, 2018. ‘Contractualism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <>.

Hooker, Brad, 2016. ‘Rule Consequentialism’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <>.

Further Reading

McNaughton, David, 1996. ‘An Unconnected Heap of Duties?’ Philosophical Quarterly 46, 186: 433-447.

Shafer-Landau, Russ, 2010. The Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford University Press), chapter 16See also chapters 13-15.

T.M. Scanlon, 1982. ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism. In Amartya Kumar Sen & Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge University Press): 103-128.

Ross, W.D., 1930. The Right and the Good (Clarendon) pp. 16-47.

Hooker, Brad, 2000. Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford University Press).

Driver, Julia, 2012. Consequentialism  (Routledge). Especially Chapter 4.

Arenson, Richard, 2005. 'Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections'. Philosophical Issues 15: 235-251.

Stratton-Lake, 2003. ‘Scanlon’s Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection’.  Analysis  63, 1:70-76

Ridge, Michael, 2003. ‘Contractualism and the New and Improved Redundancy Objection’ Analysis 63, 4: 337–342.

Suikkanen, Jussi, 2005. ‘Contractualist Replies to Redundancy Objections’. Theoria 71, 1: 38-58.

Hills, Alison, 2010. ‘Utilitarianism, Contractualism and Demandingness’. Philosophical Quarterly 60, 239: 225-242.

This list was last updated on 09/11/2021