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PHIL3421
Module Reading List

Philosophy of Mind, 2021/22, Semester 1
Dr Darren Bradley
D.J.Bradley@leeds.ac.uk
Tutor information is taken from the Module Catalogue
  1. Representation

Required:

Crane, T. 2003. The mechanical mind: a philosophical introduction to minds, machines and mental representation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

  • Chapter 5, pp.169-185.
  • Available on Minerva.  

Further:

Crane, T. 2003. The mechanical mind: a philosophical introduction to minds, machines and mental representation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

  • The rest of Chapter 5.
  • Available on Minerva.

Jacob, P. 2014. Intentionality. In: Zalta, E. ed. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. [Online]. Winter 2019 ed. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/ intentionality/.

  • Especially sections 1, 2, 8, 9, and 10.
  • Available here.
  1. Substance dualism

Required:

Lowe, E.J. 2000. An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Chapter 2.
  • Available online through the library website.

Further:

Descartes, R. 1968. Discourse on method and the meditations. London: Penguin Books.

  • Meditations II and VI.
  • A version of Decartes’ Meditations is available online here.

Gertler, B. 2007. In defence of mind-body dualism. In: Feinberg, J. and Shafer-Landau, R. eds. Reason and responsibility: readings in some basic problems of philosophy. Wadsworth, pp.303-315.

Ryle, G. 1949. The concept of mind. London: Routledge.

  • Chapter 1.
  • Available online through the library website.
  1. Behaviourism

Required:

Smith, P. and Jones, O.R. 1986. The philosophy of mind: an introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Chapter X.
  • Available on Minerva.

Further:

Lacewing, M. (2017) Philosophy for A Level: Metaphysics of God and Metaphysics of Mind (London: Routledge), Ch. 3, pp. 237-43. (introductory)  

Carnap, R. 1932/33. Excerpt from “Psychology in physical language”. In: Lycan, W. ed. Mind and cognition: a reader. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.23-28.

  • Available on Minerva.

Ryle, G. 1949. The concept of mind. London: Routledge.

  • Chapter 1.
  • Available online through the library website.
  1. The mind-brain identity theory

Required:

Smart, J.J.C. 1959. Sensations and brain processes. The Philosophical Review. 68(2), pp.141-156.

Further:

Lewis, D. 1966. An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy. 63(1), pp.17-25.

Putnam, H. 1975. Philosophical papers, volume 2: mind, language and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Chapter 21: The nature of mental states.
  1. Functionalism

Required:

Lewis, D. 1972. Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 50(3), pp.249-258.

Further:

Block, N. 1983. Troubles with functionalism. In: Block, N. ed. Readings in philosophy of psychology, volume 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.268-306.

  • This paper can also be found in many collected volumes (e.g. Chalmers, D. Philosophy of mind: classic and contemporary readings).  

Putnam, H. 1975. Philosophical papers, volume 2: mind, language and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Chapter 21: The nature of mental states.
  1. The problem of mental causation

Required:

Bennett, K. 2007. Mental causation. Philosophy Compass. 2(2), pp.316-37.

Further:

Block, N. 2003. Do causal powers drain away? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 67(1), pp.133-150.

Kim, J. 1998. Mind in a physical world: an essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sider, T. 2003. What’s so bad about overdetermination? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 67(3), pp.719-726.

  1. Qualia

Required:

Jackson, F. 1986. What Mary didn’t know. Journal of Philosophy. 83(5), pp.291-295.

Lewis, D. 1988. What experience teaches. Proceedings of the Russellian Society. 13(1), pp.29-57.

  • Relevant excerpt available on Minerva.  

Further:

Chalmers, D. 2004. Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument. In: Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y., and Stoljar, D. eds. There’s something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp.269-298.

  • Chalmers has a version without pagination on his website.

Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly. 32(127), pp.127-136.

Nagel, T. 1974. What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review. 83(4), pp.435-450.

  1. Property dualism

Required:

Chalmers, D. 1995. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2(3), pp.200-219.

  • This can be found in many collected volumes. Chalmers has a version without pagination on his website.

Further:

Bennett, K. 2021. Why I am not a dualist. In: Kriegel, U. ed. Oxford studies in philosophy of mind, volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.208-231.

  • A preprint is available here.

Chalmers, D. 2003. Consciousness and its place in nature. In: Stich, S. and Warfield, T. eds. The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of mind. Blackwell Publishing, pp.102-142.

  • Sections 9-12.
  • Available online through the library website.

Churchland, P. 1996. The Hornswoggle problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 3(5-6), pp.402-408.

  1. Panpsychism

Required:

Goff, P., Seager, W. and Allen-Hermanson, S. 2020. Panpsychism. In: Zalta, E. ed. The Stanford encylopedia of philosophy. [Online]. Summer 2020 ed. URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2020/entries/panpsychism/.

  • Section 3.
  • Available here.

Further:

Goff, P., Seager, W. and Allen-Hermanson, S. 2020. Panpsychism. In: Zalta, E. ed. The Stanford encylopedia of philosophy. [Online]. Summer 2020 ed. URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2020/entries/panpsychism/.

  • Sections 1, 2, and 4.
  • Available here.
  1. Eliminativism

Required:

Churchland, P. 1981. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy. 78(2), pp.67-90.

Further:

Dennett, D. 1988. Quining qualia. In: Marcel, A. and Bisiach, E. eds. Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F. and Pettit, P. 1990. In defence of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies. 59(1), pp.31-54.

Further resources

Recommended textbooks:

Heil, J. 2004. Philosophy of mind: a contemporary introduction. London: Routledge.

Kim, J. 2011. Philosophy of mind. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

Useful collections:

Chalmers, D. ed. 2002. Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosenthal, D. ed. 1991. The nature of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Suggestions for further readings:

More papers than you could possibly need are listed here and here.

This list was last updated on 28/10/2021