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Module Reading List

Feminist Philosophy, 2021/22, Semester 1
Dr Alison Toop
Tutor information is taken from the Module Catalogue

Unit 1: Gender

Week 1: Introduction

No Assigned Reading but if you want to read one thing, read:

Mari Mikkola, ‘Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <>.


Further Reading

Alison Stone, Feminist Philosophy: An Introduction (Polity, 2007): chapter 2.

Sally Hines, Is Gender Fluid? A Primer for the 21st Century (Thames & Hudson, 2018) 

Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (Routledge 2006).

Mari Mikkola, The Wrong of Injustice (Oxford University Press, 2016): chapters 2-3.

Elinor Mason, Feminist Philosophy: An Introduction (Routledge, 2021), Introduction.


Week 2: Social Position Accounts of Gender

Assigned Reading

Sally Haslanger, ‘Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be? Noûs 34, 1 (2000):31–55

Robin Dembroff, ‘Real Talk on the Metaphysis of Gender’. Philosophical Topics 46, 2 (2018): 21-50.


Further Reading

Ásta, Categories we Live By (Oxford University Press, 2018) chapter 1, chapter 4.

Elizabeth Barnes, ‘Gender and Gender Terms’, Noûs 54, 3 (2020):704-730

Katharine Jenkins, ‘Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman’, Ethics 126, 2: 394-421.

Theodore Bach, 'Gender is a Natural Kind with a Historical Essence', Ethics 122, 2 (2012): 231-272

Mari Mikkola, The Wrong of Injustice (Oxford University Press, 2016): chapter 4

Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett, 'Conceptual Ethics 1', Philosophy Compass  8, 12 (2013): 1091-1101.

Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett, 'Conceptual Ethics 2', Philosophy Compass 8, 12 (2013): 1102-1110

Esa Diaz-Leon, ‘Woman as a Political Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle’, Hypatia 31, 2 (2016): 245-258.

Jennifer Saul, ‘Politically Significant Terms and Philosophy of Language:Methodological Issues’. In Sharon Crasnow and Anita Superson (eds.), Out from the Shadows. (Oxford University Press, 2012)

N. G. Laskowski, ‘Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23, 1 (2020): 39-51.

Sarah McGrath, ‘The Metaethics of Gender’, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16 (Oxford University Press, 2021)

Week 3: Gender Identity 

Assigned Reading

Katharine Jenkins, ‘Toward an Account of Gender Identity’, Ergo 5, 27 (2018): 713-744.

Elizabeth Barnes, ‘Gender Without Gender Identity: The Case of Cognitive Disability’. Forthcoming in Mind. Available here: (This is also in the course readings folder)


Further Reading

Robin Dembroff, ‘Genderqueer as Critical Gender Kind’, Philosophers’ Imprint 20, 9: 1-23.

Talia Bettcher, ‘Through the Looking Glass: Trans Theory Meets Feminist Philosophy’. In Ann Garry, Serene Khader, and Alison Stone (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy (Routledge, 2017): 393–404.

Matthew Salett Adler, ‘Gender Identity and Exclusion: A Reply to Jenkins’. Ethics 127, 4 (2017): 883-895.

Jennifer McKitrick, ‘A Dispositional Account of Gender’. Philosophical Studies 172, 10 (2015): 2575–2589.

Richard Rowland, ‘Normativity and Gender Identity’, Draft manuscript – see course readings folder in learning resources tab

Talia Bettcher. ‘Trans Identities and First-Person Authority’. In Laurie Shrage (ed.), You’ve Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity (Oxford University Press 2009): 98–120

Dembroff, Robin and Daniel Wodak (2018). ‘He/She/They/Ze’. Ergo 5 14: 371-406.

Stephanie Kapusta, ‘Misgendering and its Moral Contestability’. Hypatia 31, 3 (2016): 502-519.



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Unit 2: Feminist Epistemology

Assigned reading  

Wylie, A. (2003). "Why Standpoint Matters." In R. Figueroa & S. Harding (Eds), Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology pp. 26-48.  

McKinnon, R. (2016). "Epistemic Injustice", Philosophy Compass 11: 437-446.  

Anderson, E. (1995). "Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense." Hypatia10(3), 50-84.  

Longino, H. E. (2004). "How Values Can Be Good for Science." In P. Machamer & G. Wolters (Eds.), Science, Values, and Objectivity pp. 127-142. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Available online 

Further Reading  

Collins, P. H. (2000). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. New York: Routledge. (particularly Chapter 11)

Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maitra, I. (2010). "The Nature of Epistemic Injustice", Philosophical Books. 51: 195-211. 

Langton, R. (2010). "Review of Epistemic Injustice", Hypatia 25: 459-464.

Fine, C. (2012). "Explaining, or sustaining, the status quo? The potentially self-fulfilling effects of ‘hardwired’ accounts of sex differences." Neuroethics5(3), 285-294. Available online

Fine, C. (2008). "Will Working Mothers’ Brains Explode? The popular new genre of neurosexism." Neuroethics1(1), 69-72. Available online

Hicks, D. (2011). "Is Longino's Conception of Objectivity Feminist?" Hypatia  26: 333-351.

Longino, H. E. (2017). "Feminist epistemology." The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, 325-353.

Solomon, M. (1994). "Social Empiricism." Noûs28(3), 325-343.

Harding, S. (1995). “Strong Objectivity: A response to the new objectivity question." Synthese104(3), 331-349.

Longino, H. E., & Lennon, K. (1997). "Feminist epistemology as a local epistemology." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes71, 19-54.

Longino, H. E. (1987). "Can there be a feminist science?" Hypatia2(3), 51-64.

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Unit 3: Marriage and Social Justice

Assigned Reading

Okin, S. (1989). Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books. Chapter 7, “Vulnerability by Marriage”   Available as an Online Course Reading in Minerva 

Chambers, C. (2013). "The Marriage-Free State", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2): 123-143.  

Brake, E. (2010). “Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law”. Ethics 20 (2): 302-337.  

Further Reading

Brake, E. (2012). Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality and the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (particularly Chapter 5 “Critiques of Marriage”, Chapter 7 “Minimizing Marriage” and Chapter 8 "Challenges for Minimal Marriage")  

Calhoun, C. (2002). Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (particularly Chapter 5 “Defending Marriage”)  

Chambers, C. (2017). Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free StateOxford: Oxford University Press

Ettelbrick, P. (1997). “Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?”, in Blasius and Phelan (eds.), We Are Everywhere: A Historical Sourcebook of Gay and Lesbian Politics. London: Routledge.   Available as an Online Course Reading in Minerva 

Ferguson, A. 2007. “Gay Marriage: An American and Feminist Dilemma” Hypatia, Vol. 22 (1): 39-57.

Ferguson, M.L. 2016. "Vulnerability by Marriage: Okin’s Radical Feminist Critique of Structural Gender Inequality" Hypatia Vol.31 (3): 687-703.

Hill Collins, P. 1997. "African-American Women and Economic Justice: A Preliminary Analysis of Wealth, Family, and Black Social Class" University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol.65 (3): 852-52.

Hill Collins, P. 1998. "It's All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Nation" HypatiaVol. 13 (3): 62-82.

Okin, S. (1989). Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books. Chapter 8, “Conclusion: Toward a Humanist Justice”   OCR REQUESTED BY LIBRARY (HT 10/08/2021) 

Watson, L and Hartley, C. (2018). Equal Citizenship and Public ReasonOxford: OUP. (particulalry Chapter 9 "Political Liberalism and Marriage")

Wedgwood, R. (2016). ‘Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?’ in Elizabeth Brake, ed. (2016) After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Wenar, Leif, "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <>. (Particularly sections 3 & 4) 

This list was last updated on 10/11/2021